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Individual Horizon Preferences 
 We use the term horizon preference to refer to 
an organizational decision maker’s general 
individual preference for long-term versus 
short-term results. 
◦ A manager with short-term (or long-term) 
preferences 
 
 Project horizon is the period it takes to realize 
substantially all the benefits from a project. 
◦ A short-term (long-term) project. 
◦ A project mix refers to a mix of a short-term and a  
long-term project. 
Practical Motivations 
 Managers’ choices of project mix can have 
important implications toward organizations’ 
strategic performance.  
◦ E.g. managerial short-term orientation may lead to 
short-run profit maximization at the expense of long-
run profitability (Bhojraj and Libby 2005).  
 
 Knowledge about managers’ preferences can 
help their superiors to make informed decisions 
regarding control and incentive systems to 






 Existing literature mixes the effect of 
organizational factors with individual factors 
regarding horizon issues. 
◦ Managerial time orientation 
◦ Managerial myopia 
 
 Antecedents of managerial time orientation 
◦ Capital market pressures / control system / incentive 
system 
◦ Frequency of information disclosures  







 This study introduces the effect of individual 
behavioral factors, such as individuals’ cognition, 
motivation or pre-existing attitudes under 
accountability. 
◦ Sunk cost literature 
◦ Directional preference literature 
◦ Salience literature 
 
 This study suggests the influences of other social 
factors that can affect individual motivations and 
cognitions, e.g., cultures. 
The Role of Individual Preferences 
in an Organizational Context 
Individual 
Preferences (sunk 








system and control 
system) 

















Data Collection in the 2x2 
Experiment 
1. Participants assume roles as project managers in a 
fictitious firm who need to spend unexpected budget 
surplus between a short-term project and a long-term 
project 
 
2. They receive messages about their superior’s 
potential horizon preferences (IV 1- org level) 
3. They report their perceptions of superiors’ horizon 
preferences (process variable) 
4. They make budget allocation decision (DV) 
5. They report their own horizon preferences (IV2 – 
individual level) 
Messages Used in the Instrument 
 As you think about how to spend the budget surplus, you 
recall that your superior, the manager of the floor mat 
division, consistently invests significantly less (more) 
than the average of industry peers in 
◦ research and development projects 
◦ continued professional education for employees, and 
◦ socially and environmentally friendly projects for local communities. 
 
 In addition, you learn from a reliable source that your 
superior regularly exercises all stock options that are part 
of a division manager’s compensation as they become 
available and sells (retains) the stocks. As a result, your 
division manager owns a negligible (substantial) 
amount of stock in GLW (note: the fictitious firm). 
 
Profile of Participants 
We recruited 63 upper-level undergraduate and graduate 
business students who have completed fundamental 
course work in accounting, economics, finance, marketing 
and management. 52% of them are male. 






Mean 26 6 4 
Median 24 5 2 
Std. Dev. 5.83 3.39 5.69 
Min. 20 1 0 
Max. 42 17 23 
Regression Test of H1 
 Expectancy-value theory proposes that 
individuals’ choice of goals is a function of the 
algebraic product of two parameters: the 
expectancy and the value (or valence). 
◦ A match of short-term (long-term) preferences will 
increase likelihood of investment in short-term (long-
term) project mix.  
 
 The result shows that managers’ choices over 
project mix are influenced by the interaction 
form of their perceptions and their own 
horizon preferences (β = 0.207*).  
 
Contribution Related to H1 
 This result provides corroborating evidence to the 
effect of organizational variables on judgment and 
decision-making related to managerial myopia.  
 
 This result extends this literature by separating the 
effect of individual dispositional dimension from the 
effect of the organizational dimension on managerial 
myopia. 
 
 The result shows that decision makers engage in 
deliberate reasoning process to infer the superior’s 
horizon preference and to integrate this information 
into their choices.  
Regression Test of H2 
 Literature on motivated reasoning and direction 
preferences propose that managers’ horizon 
preferences will influence their judgment.  
 
 The result shows that managers’ horizon 
preferences influence their processing of 
messages and their formation of perceptions of 
their superior’s preferences (β = 0.711***). 
 
Contribution Related to H2 
 The result suggests that decision makers can 
arrive at biased judgments and decisions even 
when they try to be accurate and engage in 
elaborate information processing.  
 
 The result extends the literature of directional 
preference with measurement of preferences 
having more external validity and arguably more 
persistency than that created through 
experimental manipulations. 
 















- Salience means only one preference is processed. 
- Salience is determined by motivational processes and 
cognitive processes. 
Planned Contrast Test of H3 
 The result shows that when exposed to 
the effects of perceived superior’s 
preferences, managers with long-term 
preferences are more committed to their 
pre-existing preferences (t29 = 0.383 ns) 
than managers with short-term 
preferences (t30 = 2.847**). 
 
Figure 1: Plot of Estimated Marginal 
Mean 
Take-away from H3 
 The result demonstrates the persistent effect of 
individual horizon preferences.  
 
 The commitment to individual horizon 
preferences may be functions of  individuals’ 
past experiences, their information processing 
abilities, and some motivational processes.  
 
 The result suggests that managers’ commitment 
to their preferences competes against their 
commitment to organizational goals.  
 
Practical Implications 
 The results suggest that an organization with a long-
term strategic goal can set up long-term oriented 
financial targets and the corresponding management 
control system for middle managers.  
 
 The subsequent long-term oriented mindsets of middle 
managers will become a change-resistant mechanism 
that will continue working towards the initial strategic 
goals despite that environmental factors may indicate 
otherwise.  
 
 Their long-term oriented mindsets and behaviors can 
help guide the behaviors of low-level employees.  
Thanks! 
